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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-471
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CHEMICAL WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC., PETIT-
IONER v. GUY HUNT, GOVERNOR OF
ALABAMA et al.
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
alabama
[June 1, 1992]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Alabama imposes a hazardous waste disposal fee on
hazardous wastes generated outside the State and disposed
of at a commercial facility in Alabama.  The fee does not
apply to such waste having a source in Alabama.  The
Alabama Supreme Court held that this differential treat-
ment does not violate the Commerce Clause.  We reverse.
                            I
  Petitioner, Chemical Waste Management, Inc., a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in Oak
Brook, Illinois, owns and operates one of the Nation's oldest
commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities, located
in Emelle, Alabama.  Opened in 1977 and acquired by
petitioner in 1978, the Emelle facility is a hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facility operating pursuant
to permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2795, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 90
Stat. 2003, as amended, 15 U. S. C. 2601 et seq. (1988 ed.
and Supp. II), and by the State of Alabama under Ala. Code
22-30-12(i) (1990).  Alabama is 1 of only 16 States that
have commercial hazardous waste landfills, and the Emelle
facility is the largest of the 21 landfills of this kind located
in these 16 States.  Brief for Nat. Governors' Assn. et al. as
Amici Curiae 3, citing E. Smith, EI Digest 26-27 (Mar.
1992).
  The parties do not dispute that the wastes and substanc-
es being landfilled at the Emelle facility -include substances
that are inherently dangerous to human health and safety
and to the environment.  Such waste consists of ignitable,
corrosive, toxic and reactive wastes which contain poisonous
and cancer causing chemicals and which can cause birth
defects, genetic damage, blindness, crippling and death.-
584 So.2d 1367, 1373 (1991).  Increasing amounts of out-of-
state hazardous wastes are shipped to the Emelle facility
for permanent storage each year.  From 1985 through 1989,
the tonnage of hazardous waste received per year has more
than doubled, increasing from 341,000 tons in 1985 to
788,000 tons by 1989.  Of this, up to 90% of the tonnage
permanently buried each year is shipped in from other
States.
  Against this backdrop Alabama enacted Act No. 90-326
(the Act).  Ala. Code 22-30B-1 to 22-30B-18 (1990 and
Supp. 1991).  Among other provisions, the Act includes a
-cap- that generally limits the amount of hazardous wastes
or substances that may be disposed of in any 1-year
period, and the amount of hazardous waste disposed of
during the first year under the Act's new fees becomes the
permanent ceiling in subsequent years.  Ala. Code
22-30B-2.3 (1990).  The cap applies to commercial
facilities that dispose of over 100,000 tons of hazardous
wastes or substances per year, but only the Emelle facility,
as the only commercial facility operating within Alabama,
meets this description.  The Act also imposes a -base fee- of
$25.60 per ton on all hazardous wastes and substances
disposed of at commercial facilities, to be paid by the
operator of the facility.  Ala. Code 22-30B-2(a) (Supp.
1991).  Finally, the Act imposes the -additional fee- at issue
here, which states in full:
      -For waste and substances which are generated
outside of Alabama and disposed of at a commercial
site for the disposal of hazardous waste or hazardous
substances in Alabama, an additional fee shall be
levied at the rate of $72.00 per ton.-  22-30B-2(b).
  Petitioner filed suit in state court requesting declaratory
relief against the respondents and seeking to enjoin
enforcement of the Act.  In addition to state law claims,
petitioner contended that the Act violated the Commerce,
Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States Constitution, and was preempted by various federal
statutes.  The Trial Court declared the base fee and the cap
provisions of the Act to be valid and constitutional; but,
finding the only basis for the additional fee to be the origin
of the waste, the Trial Court declared it to be in violation
of the Commerce Clause.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-88a.
Both sides appealed.  The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
the rulings concerning the base fee and cap provisions but
reversed the decision regarding the additional fee.  The
court held that the fee at issue advanced legitimate local
purposes that could not be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives and was therefore valid
under the Commerce Clause.  584 So.2d, at 1390.
  Chemical Waste Management, Inc., petitioned for writ of
certiorari, challenging all aspects of the Act.  Because of the
importance of the federal question and the likelihood that
it had been decided in a way conflicting with applicable
decisions of this Court, Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c), we
granted certiorari limited to petitioner's Commerce Clause
challenge to the additional fee.  502 U. S. - (1992).  We
now reverse.
                           II
  No State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem
common to the several States by raising barriers to the free
flow of interstate trade.  Today, in Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, post,
p. ___, we have also considered a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge to a Michigan law prohibiting private landfill opera-
tors from accepting solid waste originating outside the
county in which their facilities operate.  In striking down
that law, we adhered to our decision in Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), where we found New Jersey's
prohibition of solid waste from outside that State to amount
to economic protectionism barred by the Commerce Clause:
-`[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends.  Thus, it does not
matter whether the ultimate aim of ch. 363 is to reduce
the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to
save remaining open lands from pollution, for we
assume New Jersey has every right to protect its
residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment.
And it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may
pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into
the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate
commerce may incidentally be affected.  But whatever
New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accompa-
nied by discriminating against articles of commerce
coming from outside the State unless there is some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them different-
ly.  Both on its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363
violates this principle of nondiscrimination.

      -`The Court has consistently found parochial legisla-
tion of this kind to be constitutionally invalid, whether
the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a
steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly
ruinous outside competition, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U. S. [511,] 522-524 [(1935)]; or to create jobs
by keeping industry within the State, Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1, 10 [(1928)]; John-
son v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 16 [(1928)]; Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U. S. [385,] 403-404 [(1948)]; or to preserve the
State's financial resources from depletion by fencing
out indigent immigrants, Edwards v. California, 314
U. S. 160, 173-174 [(1941)].'-  Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, post, at - (quoting Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, supra, at 626-627).

To this list may be added cases striking down a tax discrim-
inating against interstate commerce, even where such tax
was designed to encourage the use of ethanol and thereby
reduce harmful exhaust emissions, New Energy Co. of Ind.
v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 279 (1988), or to support
inspection of foreign cement to ensure structural integrity,
Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U. S. 375, 379-380 (1939).
For in all of these cases, -a presumably legitimate goal was
sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating
the State from the national economy.-  Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, supra, at 627.
  The Act's additional fee facially discriminates against
hazardous waste generated in States other than Alabama,
and the Act overall has plainly discouraged the full opera-
tion of petitioner's Emelle facility.  Such burdensome taxes
imposed on interstate commerce alone are generally
forbidden:  -[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident
more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs
entirely within the State.-  Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U. S. 638, 642 (1984); see also Walling v. Michigan, 116
U. S. 446, 455 (1886); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 439
(1880).  Once a state tax is found to discriminate against
out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down without
further inquiry.  See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 406-407 (1984); Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, 451 U. S. 725, 759-760 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange
v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 336-337 (1977).
  The State, however, argues that the additional fee
imposed on out-of-state hazardous waste serves legitimate
local purposes related to its citizens' health and safety.
Because the additional fee discriminates both on its face
and in practical effect, the burden falls on the State -to
justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the
statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.-
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S.
333, 353 (1977)); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
post, at ___; New Energy Co., supra, at 278-279.  -At a
minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest
scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of
the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.-  Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 337 (1979).
  The State's argument here does not significantly differ
from the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusions on the
legitimate local purposes of the additional fee imposed,
which were:
      -The Additional Fee serves these legitimate local
purposes that cannot be adequately served by reason-
able nondiscriminatory alternatives:  (1) protection of
the health and safety of the citizens of Alabama from
toxic substances; (2) conservation of the environment
and the state's natural resources; (3) provision for
compensatory revenue for the costs and burdens that
out-of-state waste generators impose by dumping their
hazardous waste in Alabama; (4) reduction of the
overall flow of wastes traveling on the state's highways,
which flow creates a great risk to the health and safety
of the state's citizens.-  584 So.2d, at 1389.

These may all be legitimate local interests, and petitioner
has not attacked them.  But only rhetoric, and not explana-
tion, emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate
hazardous waste to meet these goals.  As found by the Trial
Court, -[a]lthough the Legislature imposed an additional fee
of $72.00 per ton on waste generated outside Alabama,
there is absolutely no evidence before this Court that waste
generated outside Alabama is more dangerous than waste
generated in Alabama.  The Court finds under the facts of
this case that the only basis for the additional fee is the
origin of the waste.-  App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-84a.  In the
face of such findings, invalidity under the Commerce Clause
necessarily follows, for -whatever [Alabama's] ultimate
purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating
against articles of commerce coming from outside the State
unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently.-  Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at
626-627; see New Energy Co., supra, at 279-280.  The
burden is on the State to show that -the discrimination is
demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to
economic protectionism,- Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S.
-, - (slip op., at 16) (1992) (emphasis added), and it has
not carried this burden.  Cf. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
post, at ___.
  Ultimately, the State's concern focuses on the volume of
the waste entering the Emelle facility.  Less discriminato-
ry alternatives, however, are available to alleviate this
concern, not the least of which are a generally applicable
per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of
within Alabama, cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U. S. 609, 619 (1981), or a per-mile tax on all vehicles
transporting hazardous waste across Alabama roads, cf.
American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266,
286 (1987), or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage
landfilled at Emelle, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U. S., at 626, which would curtail volume from all sources.
To the extent Alabama's concern touches environmental
conservation and the health and safety of its citizens, such
concern does not vary with the point of origin of the waste,
and it remains within the State's power to monitor and
regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all
hazardous waste within its borders.  Even with the possible
future financial and environmental risks to be borne by
Alabama, such risks likewise do not vary with the waste's
State of origin in a way allowing foreign, but not local,
waste to be burdened.  In sum, we find the additional fee
to be -an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State-
with most of the burden of slowing the flow of waste into
the Emelle facility.  Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S.,
at 629.  -That legislative effort is clearly impermissible
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.-  Ibid.
  Our decisions regarding quarantine laws do not counsel
a different conclusion.  The Act's additional fee may not
legitimately be deemed a quarantine law because Alabama
permits both the generation and landfilling of hazardous
waste within its borders and the importation of still more
hazardous waste subject to payment of the additional fee.
In any event, while it is true that certain quarantine laws
have not been considered forbidden protectionist measures,
even though directed against out-of-state commerce, those
laws -did not discriminate against interstate commerce as
such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles,
whatever their origin.-  Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra,
at 629.  As the Court as stated in Guy v. Baltimore, 100
U. S., at 443:
-In the exercise of its police powers, a State may
exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein
of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised,
are prejudicial to the health or which would endanger
the lives or property of its people.  But if the State,
under the guise of exerting its police powers, should
make such exclusion or prohibition applicable solely to
articles, of that kind, that may be produced or manu-
factured in other States, the courts would find no
difficulty in holding such legislation to be in conflict
with the Constitution of the United States.-

See also Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 151 (1902);
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 472 (1878).
  The law struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey left
local waste untouched, although no basis existed by which
to distinguish interstate waste.  But -[i]f one is inherently
harmful, so is the other.  Yet New Jersey has banned the
former while leaving its landfill sites open to the latter.-
437 U. S., at 629.  Here, the additional fee applies only to
interstate hazardous waste, but at all points from its
entrance into Alabama until it is landfilled at the Emelle
facility, every concern related to quarantine applies perforce
to local hazardous waste, which pays no additional fee.  For
this reason, the additional fee does not survive the appro-
priate scrutiny applicable to discriminations against
interstate commerce.
  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986), provides no
additional justification.  Maine there demonstrated that the
out-of-state baitfish were subject to parasites foreign to in-
state baitfish.  This difference posed a threat to the State's
natural resources, and absent a less discriminatory means
of protecting the environment-and none was available-
-the importation of baitfish could properly be banned.  Id.,
at 140.  To the contrary, the record establishes that the
hazardous waste at issue in this case is the same regardless
of its point of origin.  As noted in Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, -our conclusion would be different if the imported
waste raised health or other concerns not presented by
[Alabama] waste.-  Post, at -.  Because no unique threat
is posed, and because adequate means other than overt
discrimination meet Alabama's concerns, Maine v. Taylor
provides the State no respite.
                           III
  The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed,
and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion, including consideration of the appropriate
relief to petitioner.  See McKesson Corp. v. Florida Division
of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U. S. 18, 31 (1990);
Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of
Rev., 483 U. S. 232, 251-253 (1987).
                                            So ordered.